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Summary
'Who's runnin,E this community?' is a central question in pommunity Power research.
This type of research is almost completely absent in the Netherlands. It tbrms a sharp
contrast to the enormous amount of American research since the 1950s that has
attempted to llnd out whether a small (economic) elite dominates decision-making or
whether power and influence are distributed more evenly. In this study we offer insight
into rhe way polver and influence are distributed in the city of Amsterdam. To do so we
use a recently developed model: the Two Stage Model of policy-making'
The research has been guided by two questions. The first question is concerned
with the possibility of predicting outcomes of decision-making. To see whether the Two
Stage Model is a valid instrument with which to generate a distribution of power' we
wiil test it in a direct way. We will predict outcomes of decision-making. The second
leading research question is concemed with the way power and influence are distributed
u*ong organizations in two policy domains in Amsterdam. We will try to answer the
questón o1 which actors are able to leave their mark on decision-making in the city. To
answer ttris question we will also use the Two Stage Model. In the model different
aspects of power and influence are brought together. A secondary question is how the
power structure in the citY looks.
In chapter I we consider what is known about the distribution of power in Dutch
cities in general and Amsterdam in particular. The general conclusion is that the mayor
and aldermen have a stronger position than the city council. This conclusion is shared
by authors who have examined the situation in Amsterdam. The parties within the city
council are seen as an 'extension' of the mayor and aldermen. On specific policy
domains the aldermen responsible hold the strongest position. The social democratic
party (PvdA) has the strongest position within the city council and among the mayor and
aldeimen. We can conclude (on the basis of the number of seats in the council and the
number of social democratic aldermen) that the PvdA dominates local politics (especially
within the council session 1986 - 1990). Amsterdam leans to the left politically.
Little is known about the relative power positions of the city council and mayor
and aldermen on the one hand and the civil service on the other hand. In large cities
such as Amsterdam the power of the civil service is generally seen as considerable'
However, the situation in Amsterdam is unclear. The question is whether or not the
power of the civil servants is an important factor. Some services have been split.
There is a lot of research on the influence of pressure groups on local policy' The
conclusion is that pressure groups are successful now and then. The same holds true for
the situation in Amsterdam. Amsterdam has the reputation of being a 
'troublesome' city'
The outcomes of decision-making cannot be understood without taking pressure groups
into account. Whether this situation is true today can, howeveÍ, be questioned. Power
and influence are not evenly distributed in the city. Most commentators on the situation
in Amsterdam hold the opinion that the power pattern is elitist, but they do not agree
on whether it is a political, economic or civil service elite. Our conclusion is that on the
basis of the existing literature it is impossible to say how power and influence are
distributed in the city.
Who dominates decision-making?
In chapter 2 we discussed the long-standing elitist-pluralist debate. This debate centers
on the different empirical findings, the normative aspects in classifying the local
communities and the appropriate research method in community power research. Among
the empirical findings are the classical studies of Hunter (who found an economic elite
in Atlanta) and Dahl (who found a more even spread of power in New Haven). In
general, three criteria are used to classify communities: a) it is important to know
whether influence is evenly spread among actors; b) it is of interest o see which actors
dominate decision-making in different policy domains; and c) it is important to know
which category (economic, political etc.) a possible elite belongs. The third element in
the debate involves the method used. Besides the decisional method, network analysis,
the reputaÍonal and the positional method are used.
In Dutch research on power, influence and decision-making different methods are
common. One research group uses the 'intensive qualítative' method, a descriptive case
study approach. A second group uses the 'process effect' method, an approach that tries
to measure in comparable circumstances. A third group takes network analysis as a point
of departure. They look at relations between organizations. In the course of years these
three groups have developed their methods. The group that uses network analysis for
instance has developed a policy-making model in which the network is put in an
appropriate place (see Stokman and Van den Bos, 1992).
This modelling approach builds on other studies of German (Pappi and others) and
American (Laumann and others) research teams. They in their turn base their approach
on the work of James Coleman. Coleman developed a social exchange model in which
the power of actors is related to events. On the basis of this model predictions can be
made. The Coleman model was used by Laumann and Pappi to analyze three cities
(Towertown, Altneustadt and Rivercity). The resources of actors and the structure of the
network were related to the outcomes of decision-making. For the cities of Altneustadt
and Towertown the power of the actors was measured and the outcome of decisions
predicted. The predicted outcomes were compared with the actual outcomes and the
quantified power of actors compared with results from the reputational method.
We conclude that community power research has seen several important
developments ince the second half of the 1970s. Our own approach tries to incorporate
these developments. In the first place we will use a modelling approach: the Two Stage
Model of Policy-making. Second, we will predict a large number of outcomes of local
decision-making. Thirdly, our approach will be comparative. Two policy domains (Urban
development and Minorities policy) are compared. A fourth development we concur with
is the fact that cities (such as Amsterdam) should be treated as open systems. We will
deal with actors within and outside the borders of the city. Fifth, we will not focus on
individual actors but on actors at the organizational level. The organization (civil
sewices, firms, local groups, advisory boards etc.) is the unit of analysis. Sixth, we use
different (complementary) methods. Finally we are of the opinion that cities can be
ranked on a elitist-pluralist continuum.
The Two Stage Model of Policy-making
In chapter 3 we present the Two Stage Model. The model incorporates five elements.
The first element is the policy position of actors. The second element is the salience
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attached to the decisions by those involved. Power should be treated as a capacity. Only
if decisions are salient to actors will they try to influence the outcome. The third
element is the access actors have to each other. Whether an actor has the right formal
or informal relationships can be crucial. The fourth element is the combination of
resources an actor can possess. They do not all have the same amount of financial
means, expertise or other resources at their disposal. The tlfth element in the model is
the voting power of the actors. Only public actors posses voting power. Their voting
power depends on their weights in the voting procedure and on the decision rule
(unanimity, majority). On the basis of these elements, we can estimate the (positional)
power of the actors.
These elements are brought together by Stokman and Van den Bos (1992) in the
Two Stage Model. In the first stage, actors attempt to influence one another's position.
Int-luence can take place in several rounds. After the first round of influence the actors
change their initial policy positions. In the second stage, the final decision is taken. On
the basis of the new policy positions of the public actors we predict the final outcome.
After having presented the set of assumptions underlying the model, we indicate
how the model elements are operationalized. By interviewing the actors involved we
estimate the model elements (with the exception of voting power). First, we establish
the initial policy positrons of the actors. These were the positions before either the
mayor and aldermen or the commissions of the council took a decision. Second, the
organizations that were interviewed were asked to indicate the salience of the selected
issues on a scale of 0 to 100. Third, the element 'access' was operationalized by asking
from whom they received information and advice. Fourth, we distinguish eight
resources. The respondents were asked to indicate which influential actor possessed one
or more of these eight resources. In this way, influential actors received a resource
score. The element 'voting power' was calculated independently of the actors. The
mayor and aldermen all received an equal weight and 'unanimity' was used as decision
rule. The different parties within the commission and city council received voting power
on the basis of their number of seats, and 'majority' was used as the decision rule.
Two Policy Domains: Urban Development and Minorities Policy
In chapter 4 we concentrated on the two selected policy domains. We indicated on
which basis the domains urban development and minorities policy were chosen. In the
urban development domain we paid specific attention to the U-shores project and in the
domain of minorities policy to unemployment and affirmative action. In the urban
development domain several important changes take place. In the 1980s there seemed
to be more interest in large urban renewal projects than in small neighborhood renewal
schemes. An example of a large urban renewal project is the lJ-shores project.
The IJ-shores project has over the course of time changed from a pedestrian
'promenade' to a waterfront project worth millions of guilders. The way the project
should be given substance is a matter of debate. Although the local govemment wants
the project to be supported by the inhabitants of Amsterdam this does not work for all
the issues. Several issues in this subdomain were highly controversial.
In chapter 4 we also introduce the minorities policy domain. In comparison to
other large Dutch cities we note that the city of Amsterdam has the highest number of
immigrants. The minorities policy of Amsterdam has two main goals: to fight
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discrimination and racism and the disadvantages on the labor market and the lack oí
education of immigrants. A large percentage of the immigrants is unemployed. By
means of work projects and a policy of affirmative action, the ciry has tried to improve
their situation. Minorify organizations are represented in advisory boards.
Next, we indicated how the issues were collected and how a selection was made.
A total of 287 organizations eemed to be involved in one way or another in the issues
selected. All these organizations were approached for an intervierv. Of the 245
organizations that confirmed that they had participated in the decision-making, 204 were
successfully interviewed.
Issues in the U-shores and employment and afÍirmative action subdomairs
In the chapters 5 and 6 we described the selected issues in both domains. We paid
attention to the different aspects of the issues, the actors involved, their policy positions,
the different alternatives that played a role and the outcome of the decision-making
processes.
Results and conclusions
In chapter 7 the results of the study are presented. We re-examined the model elements.
Not all actors had policy positions on the issues. On some issues only experts had
positions. The salience attached to the issues varied. With regard to 'access' some actors
resembled a spider in its web. The aldermen responsible for the two domains received
the most resources. The social democratic parry (PvdA) had the largest amounl of voting
power in the two election periods 1986 - 1990 and 1990 - 1994. In the period 1990 -
1994 also the centrist party D66 received a large amount of voting power. Next, we
looked at the activities undertaken by the organizations to influence the outcome of the
decisions. Most of them used formal and informal contacts.
After examining the different model elements we addressed the predictions we
made. A distinction was drawn between retrospective predictions (the majority) and
prospective predictions. In two examples we showed how the policy positions of the
actors changed after a number of rounds of influence. To get an idea of the predictive
qualities of the model we compared the predicted outcomes with the real outcomes.
They proved to be highly correlated. We were able to colrectly predict 857c of the
outcomes on the urban development domain and 74Va on the minorities policy domain.
This is close to the percentages the German and American studies came up with.
Next, we had a closer look at the hierarchies of (positional) power that weÍe
generated by the model. The urban development domain and minorities policy domain
were compared. We also analyzed the networks of the two domains. They were found
to be centralized. The next step was to show how the actors perceived each others'
power. For both domains we examined the influence reputation of the actors. This
influence proved to be highly correlated with positional power.
Chapter 8 presents the conclusions. In the urban development domain the alderman
responsible, the social democratic party PvdA and the Physical Planning Department
(civil service) appeared to be the dominant actors. In the minorities policy domain this
was once more the alderman responsible, the mayor (Van Thijn), the PvdA and the
'Green Letl' (the most left-of-center party). In both domains political actors (the
aldermen, the parties within the council) possess the most positional power. If the
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Situation in the two domains represents the situation for the city as a whole, 
we can
conc lude tha t thec i t y i sdominu t "ouyapo l i t i ca le l i t e .Howeve r ,on thebas i so f t he
three criteria we conclude that the power structure is more pluralist than 
elitist' The
power of this political ,ilr" ln Amsrerdam (which can be held responsible during
àlections too) is tied to specific domains'
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